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Not only defi ning the nature of schizophrenia, but even defi ning schizophrenia as a diagnostic entity is still a challenge 
for psychiatry. The current diagnostic systems and the related approach to psychopathology are of little aid to this 
purpose, and have inadvertently resulted in an impoverished clinical practice. There is substantial meaning underlying 
schizophrenic symptoms that would appear bizarre and senseless from the viewpoint of a purely descriptive method. 
Psychiatry needs to devise an approach that embraces the complexity of the different perspectives of explanation 
and understanding of mental illness, examining the interplay of each element in the subjective experience. Symptoms 
such as delusion and hallucinations cannot merely be conceptualized as false judgment or lacking of external object, 
respectively, as they refl ect the fact that patients try to make sense of their different, globally altered experience of 
the self, of others and of the world. This line of reasoning builds on previous work in the phenomenological tradition 
postulating a disturbance in sensorimotor processes, which bond human beings with one another while remaining 
imperceptible to consciousness. This suggestion is consistent with a large body of research highlighting impairment 
in sensory processing in schizophrenia. Other authors underscored the importance of subtle alterations of functions 
other than sensorimotor processes, such as experiential anomalies of affectivity, cognition-perception and body-motor 
experience, alterations of self-awareness, and disturbances in reciprocal attunement leading to disconnection from a 
common register of meanings and loss of common sense. Heidegger refers to a human being as Being intrinsically self-
revelatory in the unity of physis and logos. He refers to the lived experience of being constantly in the everyday situation 
as being located, “thrown” into the world. The existence is always ‘in the world’, ‘near the things’ and ‘with the others’ 
for everybody, in the ways of ‘attunement’, ‘understanding’ and ‘discourse’, that are always together, in the unity of the 
Dasein. This conception of human existence may help understand the subjective experience of a schizophrenic patient 
and increase diagnostic accuracy and treatment adequacy.
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In his enlightening paper, Kraus drives atten-
tion to the substantial meaning that underlies 
symptoms that would appear bizarre and sense-
less from the viewpoint of a purely descriptive 
approach to psychopathology (Kraus 2010). His 
work is deeply rooted in the classical European 
tradition of phenomenology that focuses on how 
phenomena present themselves in conscious-
ness. Consistently with the notion that the signs 
and symptoms of schizophrenia reveal a global 
alteration of the basic structure of human experi-
ence advanced by other contemporary psycho-
pathologists, his main point is that hallucinations 
and delusions have substantive rather than meta-
phoric value, and thus may provide a way to un-
derstand patients’ experience.
Indeed, despite more than a Century of clini-
cal research, defi ning the nature of schizophre-
nia continues to be a challenge for psychiatrists. 
Even the simpler act of defi ning schizophrenia 
as diagnostic entity and tracing its nosological 
boundaries is proving a diffi cult task. The cur-
rent diagnostic systems and the related approach 
to psychopathology are of little aid to this pur-
pose. American psychiatry has produced a Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders that, although it helped increase diagnostic 
reliability and communication between clini-
cians, it also had the unintended consequence 
of leading to substantial changes in the nature 
and practice of the fi eld. Its apparent simplicity 
and clarity often led to abuse, due to an uncriti-
cal acceptance of the Manual, as the ultimate au-
thority on psychopathology and diagnosis. The 
widespread reliance on the Manual alone as an 
authoritative source in the fi eld of psychopa-
thology has inadvertently resulted in an impov-
erished clinical practice, where diagnoses are 
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based on simple lists of signs and symptoms that 
fi t together as entities existing in neutral space 
without any particular mood or subjectivity. An-
dreasen (2007) has expressed concern about the 
fact that DSM often forms the basis for psychiat-
ric teaching and examination of residents, so that 
the classical school in psychopathology is now 
largely ignored, and the study of phenomenol-
ogy and nosology is seen as irrelevant. Although 
the DSM was never intended to provide a com-
prehensive description of mental disorders, nor 
to reduce them to a checklist, it has actually had 
a dehumanizing impact on the practice of psy-
chiatry, discouraging clinicians from consider-
ing history and knowing the patient as an indi-
vidual. It created a common nomenclature that is 
at least partly wrong, and a series of standardised 
diagnoses that, despite their improved reliability, 
in many instances are of limited usefulness for 
research purposes because of lack of validity.
Psychiatry needs to fi nd an approach that em-
braces the complexity of the different perspec-
tives of explanation and understanding of mental 
illness, examining the interplay of each element 
in the subjective experience. A biopsychosocial 
approach that does not take into account the 
fi rst-person method can be reduced to a “vanilla” 
in which, as stated by Ghaemi (2003), “all per-
spectives deserve a seat at the table”. Instead, we 
should be able to capture the “vital connection” 
that is generated between the various factors un-
der certain conditions. As Husserl points out: 
“while the natural scientist is thus interested in the 
objective and is involved in his activity, the subjec-
tive-relative is on the other hand still functioning 
for him, not as something irrelevant that must be 
passed through but as that which ultimately grounds 
the theoretical-logical ontic validity for all objective 
verifi cation, i.e., as the source of self-evidence, the 
source of verifi cation” (Husserl, 1934-37, Ed. 1970, 
p.126).
While the Anglophone literature often character-
ises phenomenology as a descriptive rather than 
an explanatory enterprise, fortunately we have 
recently witnessed a renewed interest in Euro-
pean phenomenology. As Andreasen states:
“Fortunately, the Europeans still have a proud tra-
dition of clinical research and descriptive psycho-
pathology. Someday, in the 21st century, after the 
human genome and the human brain have been 
mapped, someone may need to organize a reverse 
Marshall plan so that the Europeans can save Ameri-
can science by helping us fi gure out who really has 
schizophrenia or what schizophrenia really is” (An-
dreasen 2007, p.112)
In this proud tradition, Kraus (2010) raises 
the fundamental question of the meaning of 
phenomena in schizophrenia, discussing the so-
called technical delusions and hallucinations. 
Delusion, he says, cannot be conceptualized as 
false cognition or judgment, or hallucination as 
lacking of external object. The way these pa-
tients experience their self and the world is com-
parable to the experience of being infl uenced 
and explored by technological processes. Thus, 
these symptoms refl ect the fact that the patients 
try to make sense of their different, globally 
altered experience of the self, of others and of 
the world. Kraus’s line of reasoning builds on 
previous work in the phenomenological tradi-
tion. Some contemporary psychopathologists 
(Grivois 1995; Raballo et al. 2006) identifi ed the 
phenomenon of self-centrality as a qualitative 
modifi cation of the psychotic experience that 
can be found in the prodromic phase and at the 
beginning of psychosis or in the post-psychotic 
phase. They point out that the emergence of ab-
normal meaning occurs generally in a sense of 
self-centrality, of “being placed in the centre”. 
The normal sensorimotor processes, which bond 
human beings with one another while remaining 
imperceptible to consciousness, are disturbed. 
According to Conrad (1958), the ability to free-
ly change reference systems is the foundation 
of interpersonal attunement. Normally, people 
are able to see themselves from “the outside”, 
“from above”, “from a bird’s eye view”, and to 
relate their own world to the general world of 
others. In the Trema phase, the schizophrenic 
has lost this possibility of transcendence and 
his consciousness is permeated with a state of 
alarm that evolves into Apophany or Anastro-
phe. Grivois (1995) reviews the normal sensori-
motor processes which bond human beings with 
one another while remaining imperceptible to 
consciousness and the disturbance of which may 
be the basis of psychosis. In the course of incipi-
ent psychosis, patients are affected both in their 
personal experience and in their public position; 
they feel dispossessed of their own selves to the 
benefi t of other individuals. They may also feel 
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that they have power over others by assisting or 
hindering them in their gestures. This gestural 
perplexity can grow into a feeling of personal 
annihilation. Yet, nobody helps patients to rec-
ognise the implicit knowledge based on the in-
terpersonal mechanism of coordination, and its 
relevance to the comprehension of meanings 
within intersubjectivity. The feeling of “central-
ity” is a constant element in such clinical situ-
ations and imposes interpretation. Consistently 
with these observations, a large body of research 
suggests that sensory processing in schizophre-
nia is impaired (Javitt 2009). Defi cits in sensory 
processing in schizophrenia are well document-
ed in the auditory system, where integrity of sen-
sory function can be assessed using well-defi ned 
event-related potentials. One of these, mismatch 
negativity, i.e., response to stimuli that devi-
ate from a predictable sequence, occupies the 
interface between sensory/perceptual and cog-
nitive processing, and is commonly generated 
independently from attention. Defi cits in mis-
match negativity generation to attributes such 
as stimulus pitch or duration deviance have con-
sistently been reported in schizophrenia. In the 
visual system, framing functions are impaired. 
Patients also show reduced sensitivity to stimu-
lus features (e.g., weight) but normal ability to 
retain representations once they are formed. Im-
paired 2-point discrimination and elevated pain 
thresholds are also well documented. Also, an 
experiment designed to assess mirror neuron ac-
tivation with a transcranial magnetic stimulation 
revealed a reduction in motor facilitation during 
action observation in schizophrenia, refl ecting a 
possible dysfunction within the mirror neuron 
system (Enticott et al. 2008). Other authors high-
lighted the central importance of subtle altera-
tions of functions other than sensorimotor proc-
esses. Klosterkötter’s transitional phenomena 
target non-psychotic experiential anomalies of 
affectivity, cognition-perception and body-mo-
tor experience (Klosterkötter et al. 2001). These 
symptoms predict subsequent development of 
schizophrenia with remarkable accuracy. Basic 
symptoms are described as alterations of subjec-
tive experience which denote the beginning of 
psychosis. Guided by phenomenological con-
siderations, Sass and Parnas (2003) proposed 
that alterations of self-awareness constitute the 
phenotypic core of schizophrenia-spectrum 
disorders. They observed self-anomalies as un-
stable fi rst-person perspective, disturbed sense 
of ownership and agency, fl uidity of the basic 
sense of identity. Sass and Parnas argued that 
schizophrenia is an ipseity disturbance with two 
complementary components: hyperrefl exivity 
and reduction of self-affection. Diminished in-
tensity or vitality of one’s own subjective self-
presence should be related to an exaggerated 
self-consciousness. These complementary dis-
tortions lead to a loss of salience or stability in 
which objects stand out in an organized fi eld of 
awareness. Ipseity (mine-ness) refers to the ex-
periential sense of recognising oneself as the 
centre around which things are placed, of being 
a living body which tends toward oneself in ones 
eternal openness to the world and to the others. 
Ipseity is a motion that maintains traces of past 
experience but at the same time transcends itself 
toward a new destination, giving a new sense to 
a past event (Costa 2009). In this perspective, 
Sass and Parnas probably underplay the notion 
that there is no experience of self without ex-
perience of others. Establishing a spontaneous 
contact with others and the ability to communi-
cate through a common symbolic register are es-
sential elements in human existence. As Stang-
hellini and Ballerini (2004) point out, common 
sense is the required condition for the possibility 
of social life. Inter-corporeality is never fully ev-
ident, but it supports all interactions connected 
with behaviour and sensations already active 
and present ahead of any explicit communica-
tion. The attunement disorder has its roots in the 
non-constitution of that common way of organ-
izing experience in its primary perceptive mo-
ment, linked to the body’s basic coenaesthesic 
experience. The sense of Self is deprived of the 
certainty of what is one’s own, and the person 
is unable to cope with social confrontation as a 
face-to-face relationship with others. The ipseity 
crisis is refl ected in a deprivation of a living per-
sonal experience in one’s body (soulless body) 
and in a contemplation of one’s own existence 
from a third person perspective (disembodied 
spirit). Although it is not possible to establish a 
pathogenetic priority among the phenomena de-
scribed above, the opportunity of reciprocal at-
tunement is the constitutional fi eld of common 
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sense, and it is probably the primum movens to-
ward the establishment of a common register of 
meanings. It should be emphasised that language 
is not only a system of signs, not just a result of 
judging or a way to communicate inner states. 
It is primarily a way through which the world 
can appear, and the appearance of meanings is 
language. Meaning is the possibility of action 
indicated by the thing, revealed by an action or 
by a word. In this sense, semantics and logic of 
schizophrenic delusions disclose the fragmenta-
tion of the coherent totality of meanings of the 
intersubjective world.
In order to shed more light on the meaning 
of the apparently bizarre “technological” posi-
tive psychotic symptoms, Kraus revisits the 
fundamental structures of Dasein (Heidegger, 
1963) and the existential a prioris. Passing over 
the difference between Kant’s and Heidegger’s 
conception of the a priori, what is very helpful 
for overcoming the antinomies of the literature 
in this fi eld is to consider the essence of a human 
being. Heidegger refers to a human being not 
as a subject opposed to an object, but as Being 
intrinsically self-revelatory in the unity of phy-
sis and logos. The term Da-sein means “being 
there/here” or “being situated”. Heidegger refers 
to the lived experience of being constantly in the 
everyday situation as being located, “thrown” 
into the world. Being-there is considered being 
always: In-a-world (In-Sein), that is historical 
and intersubjective; Near-things (Bei-Sein) that 
are ready-to-hand; and With-others (Mit-Sein), 
which includes the recognition of the presence 
of others. The existence is always “in”, “near” 
and “with” for everybody, in the ways of “at-
tunement”, “understanding” and “discourse”. 
Each man is always in a mood; his emotions 
and feelings reveal the value of things for him, 
offering them to his reasoning. Each man is ca-
pable of understanding his own possibilities in 
the context and to project himself in making his 
choices and, fi nally, to express himself in a lan-
guage, thinking or talking with others. The hu-
man world is a coherent totality of meanings. 
The understanding of the totality of references 
allows us to understand the single entity. For 
each person, comprehension has to do with the 
memory of what they can do, not of past events. 
Attunement, understanding and discourse are al-
ways together, in the unity of the Da-sein.
This conception of human existence helps 
us to understand the subjective experience of a 
schizophrenic patient, to identify the early trans-
formations in the psychotic consciousness, and 
hopefully to increase diagnostic accuracy and 
treatment adequacy through increased under-
standing.
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